An Empirical Analysis of Forecast Sharing in the Semiconductor Equipment Supply Chain by Terwiesch, Christian et al.
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Marketing Papers Wharton Faculty Research
2-2005
An Empirical Analysis of Forecast Sharing in the







Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/marketing_papers
Part of the Business Administration, Management, and Operations Commons, Business
Analytics Commons, Business and Corporate Communications Commons, Business Intelligence
Commons, Management Information Systems Commons, Marketing Commons, Operations and
Supply Chain Management Commons, and the Organizational Behavior and Theory Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/marketing_papers/280
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Terwiesch, C., Ren, Z., Ho, T., & Cohen, M. A. (2005). An Empirical Analysis of Forecast Sharing in the Semiconductor Equipment
Supply Chain. Management Science, 51 (2), 208-220. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1040.0317
An Empirical Analysis of Forecast Sharing in the Semiconductor
Equipment Supply Chain
Abstract
We study the demand forecast-sharing process between a buyer of customized production equipment and a
set of equipment suppliers. Based on a large data collection we undertook in the semiconductor equipment
supply chain, we empirically investigate the relationship between the buyer's forecasting behavior and the
supplier's delivery performance. The buyer's forecasting behavior is characterized by the frequency and
magnitude of forecast revisions it requests (forecast volatility) as well as by the fraction of orders that were
forecasted but never actually purchased (forecast inflation). The supplier's delivery performance is measured
by its ability to meet delivery dates requested by the customers. Based on a duration analysis, we are able to
show that suppliers penalize buyers for unreliable forecasts by providing lower service levels. Vice versa, we
also show that buyers penalize suppliers that have a history of poor service by providing them with overly
inflated forecasts.
Keywords
forecast sharing, trust, empirical methods, supply chain management, collaborative planning
Disciplines
Business | Business Administration, Management, and Operations | Business Analytics | Business and
Corporate Communications | Business Intelligence | Management Information Systems | Marketing |
Operations and Supply Chain Management | Organizational Behavior and Theory
This technical report is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/marketing_papers/280
An Empirical Analysis of Forecast Sharing in the
Semiconductor Equipment Supply Chain
Christian Terwiesch, Z. Justin Ren, Teck H. Ho, Morris A. Cohen
March 9, 2004
Abstract
We study the demand forecast sharing process between a buyer of customized
production equipment and a set of equipment suppliers. Based on a large data col-
lection we undertook in the semiconductor equipment supply chain, we empirically
investigate the relationship between the buyer’s forecasting behavior and the sup-
plier’s delivery performance. The buyer’s forecasting behavior is characterized by
the frequency and magnitude of forecast revisions she requests (forecast volatility)
as well as by the fraction of orders that were forecasted, yet never actually pur-
chased (forecast inflation). The supplier’s delivery performance is measured by the
supplier’s ability to meet delivery dates requested by the customers. Based on a du-
ration analysis, we are able to show that suppliers penalize the buyer for unreliable
forecasts by providing lower service levels. Vice versa, we also show that the buyer
penalizes suppliers with a history of poor service by providing them with overly
inflated forecasts.
1 Introduction
Sharing demand forecast information has been recognized as a key element in supply
chain coordination (Cachon 2001). Over the last decade, companies have engaged in var-
ious forecast sharing practices, including the commonly known Collaborative Planning,
Forecasting and Replenishment (CPFR) initiative, which was launched to “create collabo-
rative relationships between buyers and sellers through co-managed processes and shared
information.”1 Retailers such as Wal-mart and Best Buy, along with suppliers such as
Procter & Gamble and Kimberly-Clark, have all reported substantial beneﬁts from CPFR
1Web site: http://www.cpfr.org.
projects. For example, GlobalNetXchange, a consortium consisting of over 30 trade part-
ners including Sears, Kroger, Unilever, Procter& Gamble, and Kimberly-Clark, have re-
ported a 5-20% reduction in inventory costs, and an increase in oﬀ-the-shelf availability of
2-12% following the launch of their CPFR program (VICS CPFR Committee, 2002).
Despite these success stories, forecast sharing still suﬀers from several problems in
practice. In this article, we analyze two types of problems related to forecast sharing.
First, forecasts change and are continually updated as the buyer receives new information
about the demand he faces. This problem, to which we refer to as forecast volatility,
raises the question of when the forecast information provided by the buyer is suﬃciently
accurate to justify the supplier acting on it. A supplier who will act immediately on any
given forecast will likely face signiﬁcant future adjustment and rework costs.
Second, forecasts provide information about what the buyer intends to do in a given
future state of the world. These intentions, however, are not veriﬁable and cannot be en-
forced. This makes contracting based on shared forecasts extremely diﬃcult. In absence of
a contractual obligation for the buyer to purchase what she has forecasted, the buyer has
an incentive to inﬂate forecasts to assure suﬃcient supply (forecast inflation, see e.g. Ca-
chon and Lariviere 2001). Fearing inﬂated forecasts, the supplier might prefer to delay his
actions to a point in time when the buyer is willing to commit to his forecast. This set-up
shares many similarities with the classical prisoner’s dilemma: as is illustrated by Figure
1, both parties can either cooperate (buyer shares forecasts truthfully, supplier trusts the
forecast), achieving the Pareto-optimal outcome, or, as predicted by the one-period equi-
librium model, decide to act non-cooperatively (buyer inﬂates forecasts, supplier discounts
forecast) foregoing the beneﬁts of forecast sharing.
The extent to which the two parties will choose cooperative actions depends on the rele-
vant planning horizon. Most of the existing analytical research on supply chain contracting
considers one-shot games (Cachon and Netessine 2003). As we demonstrated in an earlier
paper (Cohen et al. 2003), this single period game induces the buyer to over-forecast and
the supplier to delay the initiation of a production order. More recently, there has been
a growing interest in the supply chain literature (e.g. Taylor and Plambeck 2003, Debo
1999) and beyond (see e.g. Sommer and Loch 2003 for an application in project manage-
ment) in the role of trust and reputation in multi-period games. This paper complements
this emerging area of research with an empirical foundation. Taking a multi-period per-
spective, we demonstrate that both parties consider the outcome of previous periods when
deciding if they should cooperate in the present period.
Our study is grounded on detailed data related to forecast sharing and order fulﬁllment
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that we collected in the semiconductor equipment supply chain. We created a unique
proprietary data set, capturing transactions between one buyer and 78 suppliers. Over a
period of 2 years we collected data on more than 3000 orders. This allows us to make the
following contributions. First, we show that suppliers in the semiconductor equipment
supply chain penalize the buyer for unreliable forecasts by delaying the fulﬁllment of fore-
casted orders. Speciﬁcally, we show that suppliers who have experienced large amounts of
forecast volatility from the buyer are less willing to allocate capacity towards forecasted
orders, leading to over-proportionally long tool delivery times. Second, we show that
suppliers who have been exposed to forecast inﬂation in the form of excessive order can-
cellations are less willing to allocate capacity towards forecasted orders, also leading to
over-proportionally long tool delivery times. Third, we show that the buyer penalizes
those suppliers that have not been able to meet prior delivery requests by providing them
with overly inﬂated forecasts. Together with the actions of the supplier, this penalty
scheme from the buyer creates a “tit for tat” strategy, which is in line with earlier pre-
diction from the economics literature for repeated prisoner dilemma games (e.g. Axelrod
1981, Kreps et al. 1982).
2 Research Setting
Our empirical analysis is based on a proprietary data set that we created in the semicon-
ductor equipment industry. The data set consists of one buyer and a set of 78 suppliers.
The buyer in our sample is one of the largest chip manufacturers in the industry and is
the most important buyer of semiconductor equipment worldwide. This equips the buyer
with a substantial amount of power and allows the buyer to implement forecast sharing
agreements that equipment suppliers might not agree to when facing smaller equipment
buyers. This includes the design of contracts, the implementation of information systems
as well as the request for short delivery lead-times. Given the technological complexity of
the pieces of equipment requested by the buyer and the large amount of buyer speciﬁc in-
vestments that suppliers incur, there exists only one supplier for every piece of equipment
(i.e. for any piece of equipment, the buyer is committed to a single-sourcing strategy).
While the powerful position of the buyer clearly limits the generalizability of our ﬁndings,
it is advantageous from a research design perspective, as it holds the forecast sharing
mechanism constant across all 78 suppliers in our sample.
As in many customized capital goods industries, the semiconductor equipment supply
chain faces an order fulﬁllment dilemma. On the one hand, buyers of equipment expect
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their suppliers to be responsive and to be able to fulﬁll orders within a relatively short
delivery time. On the other hand, the high value and the customized nature of the product
makes it risky for the supplier to keep ﬁnished products or sub-systems in inventory, leading
to long and variable manufacturing lead-times. Given the integral nature of the equipment,
postponement strategies, that have been found useful to shorten delivery times and to
reduce inventory risks (e.g. Lee 1996), have not yet been implemented in this industry.
To resolve this dilemma, the buyers (producers of micro chips) provide their equipment
suppliers with order forecasts for the next 24 months and longer. Unlike ﬁrm purchase
orders, such forecasted orders — also referred to as “soft orders” — are a reﬂection of the
buyer’s purchase intent and are not legally binding.
Demand for semiconductor production equipment is triggered by the (projected) de-
mand for chips, including micro-processors and memory chips. Given that the demand for
chips is in turn generated by the demand for electronic devices, semiconductor equipment
makers ﬁnd themselves at the wrong end of the “bullwhip”(e.g. Lee et al. 1997). They
face business cycles that ﬂood them with orders in one year and starve them for work in
the next (see Figure 2). The large chip producers create market forecasts on a monthly
or quarterly basis. These forecasts are used to project production capacity needs for the
next 2-5 years. Forecasts and capacity plans are updated on the basis of a rolling horizon
principle. Chip manufacturers use these product level demand forecasts combined with
equipment output models to allocate forecasted capacity requirements to both existing
and potentially new fabs. If the forecasted capacity requirement is not supported by the
size and productivity of the installed equipment base, additional equipment must be or-
dered. This projected need for additional equipment is shared with equipment suppliers
in the form of forecasted (soft) orders consistent with the principle of forecast sharing and
collaborative planning.
The chip manufacturer is unlikely to actually commit to purchase equipment at the time
of the initial placement of the soft order. Over the next two years, the chip manufacturer
will obtain new information about demand for chips as well as about the eﬀective capacity
of the currently installed equipment base (based on production yields, throughput time,
and machine up-time). As a result, the chip manufacturer may update the soft order and
will usually delay making a ﬁrm order (i.e., issue a purchase order) until about 3-6 months
prior to the projected delivery date. This ﬂexibility of the buyer, delaying a commitment
until relatively close to the delivery date, reﬂects the buyer’s strong bargaining position.
During the time between the initial placement of the soft order and the ﬁnal place-
ment of the purchase order, the buyer and the supplier continue to exchange information.
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Speciﬁcally, the buyer will inform the supplier about changes to the requested delivery
date, the location of the fab where the tool will be operating, and other delivery related
information. In contrast to these changes in delivery details, the buyer does not change
the speciﬁcation of the equipment. This reﬂects the buyer’s policy known as “Copy Exact”
(see Terwiesch and Xu 2004 for details), which postulates that every piece of production
equipment has to be absolutely identical. In absence of speciﬁcation changes, a soft order
can be modiﬁed in one of the following two ways.
(1) The requested delivery date might be moved forwards or backwards in time, reﬂect-
ing new information the buyer has about detailed capacity planning at the fab. Given
the high capital costs associated with acquiring the equipment, the buyer prefers to delay
the requested delivery date rather than to receive the equipment earlier than needed and
having it be idle.
(2) The soft order may be cancelled if market demand is less than initially projected or
if existing equipment operates at higher yield levels or at a higher level of productivity.
Alternatively, the soft order remains unchanged in the forecast sharing system. Figure
3 shows the sequence of events for a soft order that is ultimately converted into a ﬁrm
order.
Table 1 shows an example of four soft-orders representative of the type of data we
collected. This includes when the soft order was placed, how the requested delivery date
changed, and whether or not the soft-order ended up being purchased or being cancelled.
Tool #197 has a stable forecast history, but was cancelled six months after it was fore-
casted. The requested delivery date for tool #199 changed three times. Tool #316 has a
relatively stable forecasting history, and was delivered earlier than requested. In contrast,
tool #365 has a volatile forecasting history, with its requested delivery date changing
widely from as early as 8/16/2000, to as late as 12/30/2002. This order ultimately was
delivered almost 2 months later than requested.
Figure 4 shows an aggregation of order forecasts for one speciﬁc supplier. Each of the
shared forecasts is a time series consisting of the seven quarters included in the relevant
forecast window. For example, in Q2 2000, the buyer provides forecast quantities for the
time interval from Q3 2000 to Q1 2002. We observe that forecasts vary widely, both over
time (what is forecasted in Q1 2000 for the time period of Q2 2000 to Q4 2001) as well
as from one forecast to the next (e.g. what is forecasted in e.g. Q4 1998 for Q2 1999 vs.
what is forecasted in Q1 1999 for Q2 1999). Figure 4 also contrasts the forecasts with the
actual tool purchases. On average, the buyer places signiﬁcantly more soft orders than
hard orders, suggesting the presence of forecast inﬂation.
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3 Research Objectives and Hypotheses
Our objective is to identify patterns of shared order forecasting that lead to an on-time tool
delivery. Given that when a purchase order is placed, its production lead-time exceeds the
residual time available to the requested delivery date (see Figure 3), an on-time delivery
requires that the supplier has started working on an order while it was still a forecast (soft
order).
Unfortunately, the eﬀectiveness of working with forecasted orders can be greatly reduced
through non-cooperative behavior of either party, buyer and supplier. The buyer can place
more soft orders than he anticipates to place ﬁrm orders in the hope that this will secure
him production capacity of the supplier. Vice versa, the supplier can discount or even
ignore the information provided to him in the form of a soft order, knowing that he is the
single supplier for a speciﬁc tool and is almost impossible to be held accountable for a
delay in court. Consequently, the single period game between the buyer and the supplier
resembles the traditional “prisoner’s dilemma”, which is known to have a Pareto ineﬃcient
equilibrium (Figure 1).
While playing a game once can lead to mistrust and a non-cooperative outcome, the
economics literature suggests that playing a game repeatedly can lead to more cooperative
outcomes. Speciﬁcally, it has been argued that in the repeated game, parties are likely
to adopt a “tit-for-tat” strategy, i.e., cooperate (the buyer forecasts orders correctly on
average and the supplier reacts to the forecasted order) as long as the other party does the
same, and retaliate (the buyer over-forecasts and the supplier ignores forecasted orders)
upon the other party’s defection (Axelrod 1981; Kreps et al. 1982). Our hypotheses
derived below attempt to document that buyer and supplier indeed follow such a “tit-for-
tat” strategy.
The Perspective of the Supplier
Consider the perspective of the supplier ﬁrst. Given that the buyer has the right to
change the delivery dates of soft orders and can cancel any open soft order, the supplier
carries the risk of commencing production prior to receiving a ﬁrm order. However, since
the supplier depends on the buyer for business for future technology generations, the sup-
plier is unlikely to completely discount every piece of information he receives from the
buyer. Instead, the supplier will evaluate the reputation of the buyer based on prior trans-
actions, rewarding good forecasting behavior with early commencement of the production
process and penalizing bad forecasting behavior with delays.
In our context, bad forecasting behavior of the buyer is constituted by two forces,
6
forecast volatility and forecast inﬂation. Forecast volatility arises as forecasted orders are
based on preliminary information and made at a point in time at which the buyer of the
equipment still faces substantial uncertainty about his actual needs for the equipment.
This uncertainty is likely to make the forecasts volatile, which in turn makes the supplier
reluctant to commit resources to it. Forecast volatility has been analyzed by several
prior studies (for example, Heath and Jackson 1994, Graves et al. 1998, Cakanyildirim
and Roundy 1999, and Kaminsky and Swaminathan 2001). Cattani and Hausman (2000)
show that demand forecasts do not necessarily become more accurate as they are updated.
They argue that such forecast churning can cause ineﬃciencies if the ﬁrm reacts to the
wrong forecast update. A similar result has been provided by Toktay and Wein (2001).
Similar observations have also been made in the coordination and project management
literature2.
In our research setting, forecast volatility can take one of two forms, order-speciﬁc
forecast volatility and buyer-speciﬁc forecast volatility. With order-speciﬁc volatility, we
refer to the number of change requests the buyer places for a particular order3. In contrast,
we label the number of change requests (across orders) the buyer has placed with the
supplier as buyer speciﬁc forecast volatility4. Buyer speciﬁc forecast volatility thereby
captures the recent history of forecast behavior of the buyer.
Hypothesis 1a (order specific forecast volatility): The more the customer changes the
requested delivery date of a particular soft order, the more likely this particular order will
be delayed.
Hypothesis 1b (buyer specific forecast volatility): The more the buyer has changed re-
quested delivery dates for his soft orders in the past, the more likely it is for his current
order to be delayed.
A second reason why a supplier might not be willing to initiate work for a soft order
relates to the perceived probability of order cancellation. Given the complex and capital
intense production process of semiconductor manufacturing, the buyer faces severe costs if
2See Krishnan et al. (1997), Loch and Terwiesch (1998), and Roemer and Ahmadi (2000) for models of
sharing preliminary information in which an information receiving task needs to decide when it is willing
to commit resources to information supplied by other, concurrently executed, tasks.
3Consider, for example, a supplier in February 2001 who has received a soft-order in May 2000 with
an initially requested delivery date of July 2001. However, between May 2000 and February 2001, the
soft-order has been modified (e.g. pushed out) multiple times.
4Consider, again, a supplier who has received a soft-order in May 2000 with a requested delivery date
of July 2001. In January 2001, the supplier considers initiating the order fulfillment process. Yet, from
prior experience with the same buyer, the supplier knows that in more than half of the cases the buyer
has delayed the requested delivery date within five months from the initially requested delivery date
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the equipment does not arrive on the required delivery date. Late shipments of equipment,
and consequently late availability of capacity, can lead to idle time for other equipment
in the fab and potentially lost wafer output. Industry observer estimate that a one hour
delay in installing capacity of a fab is worth in excess of $100k. This creates an incentive
for the buyer to provide overly aggressive forecasts to the supplier, i.e. place more soft
orders than ﬁrm orders. As the real capacity needs of the buyer are unobservable to
the supplier, the buyer can always cancel the order and justify such change based on
information that is not veriﬁable by the supplier, e.g. an unexpected drop in demand, or
increased production yields from existing equipment. Note that, in contrast to forecast
volatility which would also exist in a vertically integrated ﬁrm, forecast inﬂation reﬂects
an opportunistic (non-cooperative) behavior of the buyer.
Forecast inﬂation has been analyzed by Lee et al. (1997), Celikbas et al. (1999), and
Cachon and Lariviere (2001). While these models are based on one-shot games, there
has been a growing interest in the role of trust and reputation in supply chains from a
multi-period perspective (Taylor and Plambeck 2003, Debo 1999, Cachon and Netessine
2003). These studies, directly or indirectly, ﬁt the repeated prisoner’s dilemma framework
outlined in Figure 1, and hence predict that the supplier will penalize the buyer for order
cancellations by providing longer delivery times:
Hypothesis 1c (forecast inflation): Past soft order cancellations prolong current order
lead time. That is, the more frequently the buyer has cancelled soft orders in the past, the
more likely it is for the supplier to delay production, which leads to longer order lead time.
Cancelled orders are especially costly to the supplier while operating at full capacity, as
in such cases the cancellation costs not only include costs of inventory and procurement,
but also the opportunity cost of lost business. We therefore extend our hypothesis as
follows:
Hypothesis 1d (forecast inflation in economic upturn): The delay from order cancellation
is more severe during an economic upturn.
The Perspective of the Buyer
While cooperation from the supplier’s perspective means reacting to the forecasted
orders provided by the buyer, cooperation from the buyer’s perspective means providing
realistic estimates for the forecasted orders. To the extent that buyer and supplier indeed
follow a tit-for-tat strategy, the buyer will react to non-cooperative behavior of the supplier
by acting non-cooperatively himself.
In the eyes of the buyer, non-cooperative supplier behavior is characterized by late
deliveries of equipment. Although the action of the supplier itself is not observable to the
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buyer, the buyer can estimate supplier cooperation based on delivery dates: everything
else equal, a supplier with late equipment deliveries is more likely to have engaged in
non-cooperative behavior than a supplier that has delivered on time.
Once the buyer has decided to punish a supplier, he can do so by placing soft-orders
and then cancelling them over-proportionally often compared to the case of cooperation.
In absence of forced compliance (Cachon and Lariviere 2001) this is the only punishment
mechanism the buyer has available during the interaction with the supplier for this tool
generation. We therefore hypothesize:
Hypothesis 2 (forecast inflation): Past delivery delays lead to an increase in future
cancellations.
4 Model Specification
We model the evolution of a soft-order to a ﬁrm order and ultimately to a delivered piece
of equipment in the form of a two stage process. The ﬁrst stage captures the fact that soft
orders can either end up as ﬁrm orders, i.e. the buyer places an order, or can be cancelled.
Conditional on being ordered, a ﬁrm order will experience a delivery time, consisting of
the elapsed time between the placement of the ﬁrm order and its arrival at the customer’s
fab. These two stages are summarized by Figure 5.
Let (s, j)denote the index of the j-th soft order the buyer places with supplier s. We




1 + exp (xs,jβ)
(1)
where xs,j is a vector of explanatory variables and β is a parameter vector of appropriate
dimensionality. Since any soft order will be either transformed into a ﬁrm order or be
cancelled, the probability of cancellation is:
Prs,j(cancel)=1-Prs,j(ﬁrm order)=
exp(xs,jβ)
1 + exp (xs,jβ)
(2)
Conditional upon the placement of a ﬁrm order, the ﬁrm order will experience a strictly
positive delivery lead time. We model the duration between the placement of a ﬁrm order
by the buyer and its delivery by the supplier using a hazard rate model (Cox 1972). Using
the hazard rate as a dependent variable, as opposed to the actual delivery lead time, has
several advantages. First, durations may have a non-normal distribution. Restricted to
be positive, they are often skewed. Thus the normality assumption of standard regression
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is violated. Second, hazard rate models should be chosen instead of standard regression
analysis when working with survival data (Helsen and Schmittlein 1993). In our case,
performing a regression analysis on only those soft orders which have been delivered would
lead to a right-censoring of the data, as many of the soft-orders we traced were not yet
delivered at the end of our data collection. Finally, hazard models are also capable of
capturing interesting dynamics of durations, i.e., the change in hazard rate over time,
which can lead to additional insights in the underlying dynamics of the order fulﬁllment
process.
Despite their advantages, standard hazard rate models require that observations are
independent of each other. This may be reasonable in the context of a medical life-time
study, yet in a manufacturing environment like the one we study, the order lead-time of
one order is likely to be positively correlated with the order lead-time of the subsequent
order at the same supplier. Such correlation reﬂects congestion eﬀects: a long lead-time
for one particular order will increase the probability of the next order in the production
pipeline also experiencing a long lead-time. Consequently, the independence assumption
is violated and a reﬁned model speciﬁcation is needed.
Let (s, i) denote the index of the i-th ﬁrm order at supplier s and let Is be the number
of ﬁrm orders received by supplier s. Deﬁne random variables Ts,i as the logarithm of
the duration between the placement of the ﬁrm order (s, i) and the delivery date of the
equipment. Let ts,i be the realizations of these random variables. We model the hazard
rate of one completed order (s, i) conditional upon the completion time of the previous
order to the same supplier, (s, i− 1) , as
h(ts,i|ts,i−1) = h0(ts,i|ts,i−1) · exp (zs,iα) (3)
where h0 (ts,i|ts,i−1) is the correlated baseline hazard function, zs,i is a vector of explanatory
variables, and α is a parameter vector of appropriate dimensionality. According to Cox





where f (.) (F (.)) is the conditional density (distribution) function for a bivariate nor-
mal distribution with identical marginal mean µ, standard deviation σ, and correlation
coeﬃcient ρ. It follows that Ts,i| (Ts,i−1 = ts,i−1) ∼ N(µ + ρ(ts,i−1 − µ), σ
2(1 − ρ2)). In
order to formally test to what extent the log-normal distribution indeed represents the
delivery durations in our sample, we performed both, a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test as well
as a traditional Chi-square test (see e.g. Law and Kelton 1991 for details). Both tests
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supported our assumption, i.e. the hypothesis of log-normality could not be rejected. The
importance of the correlation coeﬃcient, ρ, will become apparent in the estimation results
of our model.
Deﬁne an indicator variable rs,i = 0 if the duration is censored (i.e., the ﬁrm order was
not completed at the time of our data collection), and rs,i = 1 if it is not censored. Then
the likelihood contribution, i.e., the probability of observing duration ts,i conditional upon




Given supplier s, the likelihood contribution of observing the vector (ts,1, ..., ts,Is) of
delivery times is:
Prs (ts,1, ..., ts,Is) = Pr (ts,1) · Pr (ts,2|ts,1) · ... · Pr (ts,Is |ts,Is−1) (5)
Finally, we obtain the log-likelihood function of the complete two-stage model as:






ln (Prs,j (ﬁrm order)) + ln (Prs,j (cancel))
]
+ ln (Prs (ts,1, ..., ts,Is))
}
5 Construct Definition
Over the time period from September 1999 to July 2001 we collected data on all soft and
ﬁrm orders the buyer placed with his 78 equipment suppliers, leading to a total of 3031
observations. Our econometric model speciﬁed above uses two dependent variables. For
the ﬁrst stage, the dependent variable is binary, with a value of one denoting that the
soft order was converted into a ﬁrm order and a value of zero denoting a cancelation.
In total, 53.2% of the soft orders were converted into ﬁrm orders. For the second stage,
the dependent variable is the duration between the placement of the ﬁrm order and the
delivery of the equipment to the buyer’s fab.
In addition to these dependent variables, our hypotheses include the following set of
explanatory variables. For a given soft order, we measure order speciﬁc volatility (OR-
DER VOLA) as the amount of due date change (forward or backward in time) that this
soft order has experienced prior to becoming a ﬁrm order. In other words, we add up
the absolute value of all due date changes this soft order experiences. For example, a soft
order that was initially placed for May 2002, moved forward to March 2002, and ﬁnally
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moved back to June 2002 would have a score of 2+3=5 months. Similarly, we measure
buyer speciﬁc volatility (BUYER VOLA) for a given soft order as the average amount of
due date change (forward or backward in time) across all soft orders the buyer submitted
to the supplier within the last three months prior to this soft order. Both, BUYER VOLA
and ORDER VOLA, are measured in months. BUYER VOLA ranges between 0 and 16.4
months with an average of 3.76 months. In our data set, ORDER VOLA ranges from 0
to 51.2 months. The average is - coincidentally - also 3.76 months. Forecast inﬂation is
measured by comparing the number of soft order cancellations over the past three months
to the total number of (soft and ﬁrm) orders. The corresponding ratio, which we label as
CANCEL, can be interpreted as the probability of order cancellation.
We measure the overall economic conditions by including the industry’s book-to-bill
ratio, as deﬁned and tracked by Semiconductor Equipment and Materials International.
It is deﬁned as a ratio of the three-month moving average bookings to the three-month
moving average shipments for the North American semiconductor equipment industry.
This statistic characterizes the relative balance of supply and demand in the industry. If
the ratio is larger than one, demand exceeds current supply. We deﬁne a binary variable,
BOOK BILL, that is equal to one if demand exceeds supply (indicating an economic
upturn) and zero otherwise. Finally, we measure the past delivery performance of the
supplier for a given soft order as the total delay across all tool deliveries that occurred
within the last six months of this soft order. The mean value of this variable, which we
label as PAST LATE, was 0.14 month.
In addition to the variables relating directly to our hypotheses, we include several control
variables into our analysis. First, we include a binary variable DEV FAB to indicate if the
corresponding tool is requested by a development fab. Development fabs play a crucial
role in the development of new equipment technologies and thereby order tools only at
the very beginning of the tool’s product lifecycle. About 19% of the tools in our sample
were ordered for a development fab. We expect tools for development fabs to take longer
compared to tools shipped to high volume manufacturing facilities.
A second tool characteristic reﬂects diﬀerences between the traditional 8 inch wafer
technology and the new 12 inch technology. A binary variable NEW TECH is set equal
to 1 if the corresponding tool is based on 12-inch technology. Since mid 1999, fabs are
gradually shifting towards using wafers of 12 inch diameter, which leads to a much higher
number of chips on a wafer, and consequently improved productivity. Roughly 10% of
tool orders in our sample were for the new 12 inch technology. Tools for the 12-inch
technology are expected to require longer lead-times compared to tools based on 6 or 8
12
inch technologies.
Third, we use the variable TOOL PRICE to reﬂect the price of the tool as stated in
the contract between buyer and supplier. Prices for tools in our sample averaged around
$1.4 million, but in some cases went as high as $10 Million per tool. We expect expensive
tools to have longer lead-times, reﬂecting that expensive tools are typically based on more
complex technologies. Fourth, we deﬁne a binary variable FOREIGN indicating if a tool
was requested for a non US fab. Production in these fabs, all of which are owned by the
buyer, is managed locally and our interviews suggested diﬀerences between the behavior
of fabs in the US and abroad. About 16% of the tools were for non-US fabs.
Fifth, about 8.5% of the tools in our sample were re-used tools, i.e. tools that were
initially built based on an older technology and then upgraded to be usable for the latest
process technologies. Such upgrades, also referred to as converted tools, require that the
tool’s critical components are replaced. A binary variable CONVERTED is equal to one
if the tool has been converted at least once. Converted tools are expected to have shorter
lead-times.
Sixth, and ﬁnally, we need to control for the lead-time requested by the buyer when
writing a purchase order to the supplier (REQ LEADT). The fact that a tool with a
long requested lead-time will take longer until it is delivered has nothing to do with our
research focus on forecast sharing. It is the deviation from this requested lead-time that
is of interest to us. The average requested lead-time was about 5 months.
6 Estimation Results
To test our hypotheses, we speciﬁed and estimated a sequence of ﬁve models. The spec-
iﬁcations as well as the parameter estimates are reported in Table 2. Model 1 contains a
constant and the control variables DEV FAB, FOREIGN, TOOL PRICE, CONVERTED,
NEW TECH, and BOOK BILL, and - for the duration analysis only - the requested lead
time REQ LEADT. The eﬀect of the control variables are as predicted.
All models indicate that the correlation coeﬃcient between subsequent orders to the
same supplier is signiﬁcant and positive. The actual estimates range between ρ = 0.167
and ρ = 0.172. This signiﬁcant correlation captures the eﬀect of congestion in the buyer’s
production facility: if the n-th order from a given supplier is experiencing a longer than
average lead-time, chances are that also the (n + 1)st order will be delayed. Thus, our
extension of the traditional duration analysis to include ﬁrst order correlation was indeed
necessary.
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Consider Hypothesis 1a (Order Speciﬁc Forecast Volatility) and Hypothesis 1b (Supplier
Speciﬁc Forecast Volatility) ﬁrst. As shown by Model 2, forecast volatility indeed leads to
longer delivery duration as is indicated by the negative coeﬃcient of BUYER VOLA and
ORDER VOLA. Moreover, comparing the log-likelihood of Model 2 to that of Model 1,
we ﬁnd that adding these variables improves the explanatory power of the model. This is
indicated by the signiﬁcant likelihood ratio test as reported in Table 3.
Interestingly, we observe that BUYER VOLA’s impact (ranging from−0.031 to−0.036)
is stronger than that of ORDER VOLA (ranging from −0.026 to −0.031), which sug-
gests that the long-run eﬀect of supplier reputation is more profound than the short-term
eﬀect of changing a single order. Based on the relationship between the hazard rate
and the expected lead time, we obtain the marginal eﬀect on lead-time of an increase of
BUYER VOLA. Each month of delivery date change results in an average of 0.25 month
of additional delay. Thus, for every month the buyer changes the requested delivery date
of an order, she will experience a 0.25 month increase in expected lead-time. A one month
increase in the average change in requested delivery date will lead to a 0.16 month increase
in expected lead-time.
Model 3 indicates that an increase in cancellation (CANCEL) will lead to a signiﬁcant
decrease in the hazard rate, which is in line with Hypotheses 1c. Moreover, as shown
by Model 4, the business cycle, as indicated by the book-to-bill ratio (BOOK BILL), has
a strong interaction eﬀect with the forecast inﬂation measure CANCEL, conﬁrming Hy-
pothesis 1d. During a business upturn (BOOK BILL=1), the delaying eﬀect of CANCEL
increases drastically (from −0.491% to −2.838% in elasticity across models). This con-
ﬁrms our hypothesis that cancellations prolong delivery times more profoundly during an
economic upturn.
Our results suggest an increasingly delaying impact of CANCEL on the delivery time.
Moreover, the state of the economy, represented by the book-to-bill ratio, aggravates such
negative impact drastically. The impact from each additional percentage increase in
CANCEL ranges from 7.6 days (CANCEL=0%) to 14.1 days (CANCEL=45%) during
an economic downturn. The impact becomes substantially more profound during an eco-
nomic upturn, ranging from a 19.5 days (CANCEL=0%) delay to a delay of 91.2 days
(CANCEL=45%). Thus, a 1 percentage point increase in cancellation frequency leads to
an increase of 1.59 days in delivery duration.
Finally, Model 5 tests the hypothesized eﬀect of prior late shipments on the cancellation
probability. Based on the signiﬁcant coeﬃcient of PAST LATE in Model 5, we ﬁnd also
Hypothesis 2 supported. The coeﬃcient of 0.190 indicates that a one week lateness in
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previous shipments will increase the likelihood of future order cancellations by 19 percent-
age points. This complements the tit-for-tat perspective to the repeated buyer interaction
that we had discussed in the introduction to this manuscript.
7 Model Validation
To validate the robustness of our results with respect to our construct deﬁnition, we used
alternative measures for buyer volatility (BUYER VOLA) and cancellation probability
(CANCEL). In addition to measuring these constructs based on the last three months as
deﬁned above, we varied the “memory” of these variables to six and nine months. Similarly,
for the past shipment delays from the supplier (PAST LATE), we used a time window
of three and nine months. All our ﬁndings reported in Table 2 remained structurally
unchanged.
To validate the robustness of our results with respect to our sample composition, we ran
our analysis with and without the converted tools. Again, all results of Table 2 remained
structurally unchanged.
To test the validity of our logit model (ﬁrst stage), we calculated its ability to correctly
predict if a soft order would become a ﬁrm order as opposed to being cancelled. Our
logit model predicts more than 70% of the binary outcomes correctly, which is in line with
previous applications of logit models.
To test the validity of our duration analysis (second stage), we performed a May-Hosmer
test. Intuitively, the test is based on a comparison of the observed number of deliveries
with the expected number of deliveries as predicted by the duration analysis (see May
and Hosmer 1998). The test ﬁrst requires calculating the estimated risk score zα̂ for each
observation, and then grouping the subjects into subgroups indexed g = 1, ..., G. For each
subgroup, we compute and compare the observed and the expected number of uncensored
deliveries. A large p-value (typically, over 10%) accepts the hypothesis that there is no
signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the observed number of deliveries and the expected number
of deliveries, and therefore indicates a good model prediction. The test results are reported
in Table 4.
We observe that our model performs well except for the ﬁrst and the last decile. The
ﬁrst decile is not of signiﬁcance because the corresponding sub-group only contains 2 obser-
vations. The 10th decile has 51 observed deliveries, compared to 31 predicted deliveries.
This is due to the fact that the risk score subgroup contains observations with unusually
large risk scores, and our model fails to predict those outliers. For the other groups,
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which contain 96.5% of the observations in our sample, the test results show that our
model predicts well, with p-values all greater than 10%.
The overall model ﬁt is visualized by plotting the actual observed durations against the
ﬁtted durations (Figure 6). Towards this end, we increase the number of subgroups to
100. A perfect model ﬁt would lead to points lying on the 45 degree line in the graph.
The points obtained from our model are overall close to the 45 degree line, indicating a
good ﬁt. This is formalized by the following regression analysis:
Pr edicted=− 0.28+0.94∗ ×Observed
* indicates significance at 0.1% level. R2 = 90.5%.
Despite this good ﬁt, it should be emphasized that our empirical ﬁndings might not
directly generalize to other supply chain setttings. The strong buyer, the fast changing
technology, and the complexity of the orders clearly diﬀerentiate the semiconductor equip-
ment supply chain from many other industrial settings. Empirical future research in other
industries is needed to overcome this limited generalizability.
8 Conclusion
Forecast sharing has the potential to dramatically improve supply chain performance. Yet,
as demonstrated by our research ﬁndings, a supply chain might not be able to achieve the
potential performance improvements from forecast sharing. From the perspective of the
supplier, the forces that prevent eﬀective forecast sharing are forecast volatility and fore-
cast inﬂation. Forecast volatility arises as forecasts are based on preliminary information
and made at a point in time at which the equipment buyer still faces substantial un-
certainty about the market demand for chips as well as of the capacity of the presently
installed production equipment. As the buyer is exposed to additional information, she
updates her forecasts provided to the supplier. While always sharing the latest information
with the supply chain seems like a reasonable behavior of the buyer, frequent updates of
information are perceived as disturbing from the perspective of the supplier. As we showed
with respect to Hypothesis 1a, the supplier views a soft order which as been changed al-
ready multiple times, as less reliable than a soft order which has not yet been changed.
Consequently, the supplier is not willing to allocate production capacity to this soft order.
Hypothesis 1b demonstrates that frequent changes to one soft order have externalities on
how the supplier views future soft orders. Speciﬁcally, the more a buyer changes the re-
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quested delivery dates for her equipment, the more the supplier will wait for the forecasts
to stabilize when considering subsequent soft orders.
Forecast inﬂation can occur in the semiconductor equipment supply chain as the buyer
has an incentive to create overly aggressive forecasts. Forecast inﬂation is facilitated
in our setting as shared forecasts are not veriﬁable and thereby the supplier will never
be able to validate whether actual inﬂation occurred. However, as we demonstrate in
conjunction with Hypothesis 1c, frequent forecast inﬂation can hurt the buyer in the long
run. This penalty for past cancellations is especially severe during an economic upturn,
during which the supplier has many other proﬁtable opportunities to use his production
capacity (Hypothesis 1d).
Similar to the supplier, who penalizes the buyer for inﬂated forecasts through longer
delivery times, the buyer provides more aggressive forecasts to those suppliers that have
failed to deliver previous orders on time (Hypothesis 2). This follows the logic of the
repeated prisoner’s dilemma game and establishes that both buyer and supplier apply a
“tit-for-tat” strategy.
Our empirical research ﬁndings and our multi-period framework of forecast sharing
opens up interesting opportunities for future research. First, we believe additional research
is needed to analyze supply chain coordination in repeated game settings. While repeated
games have been extensively studied in the economics literature, most of the contracting
research in operations management has taken a rather static perspective, ignoring eﬀects
of trust building and reputation.
Second, one needs to overcome the forecast volatility problem. Currently, forecasts pro-
vided by the buyer do not acknowledge that they are based on preliminary information and
are likely to change. Thus, while the buyer shares the expected outcome for a particular
equipment order in the form of a best guess, she does not relay information reﬂecting possi-
ble alternative outcomes as well as the probabilities that such alternative outcomes occur.
The supplier in turn perceives the - almost unavoidable - iterations as an indication that
the shared forecasts are of low quality and consequently is not willing to commit resources
based on this information. Recent research related to the information sharing in teams
outline alternative approaches to this (Terwiesch et al. 2002), including the concept of
sharing information in the form of sets, which are gradually narrowed over time, opposed
to sharing information in the form of points, which “jump around” in an unpredictable
fashion. In our setting, set-based information sharing could be based on quantities (“we
will order between 5 and 10 tools this year”) or requested delivery times (we need this
soft order between June and December). Addressing some of the concerns related to trust
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and reputation raised by the present research study, the buyer initiated a fundamental
redesign of the forecast sharing mechanism, which included providing information to the
suppliers about forecasted orders in the form of intervals.
While new information technologies have enabled ﬁrms involved in a supply chain to
gain visibility into the planning processes of other ﬁrms, our ﬁndings demonstrate that
their remain substantial organizational barriers preventing ﬁrms to fully achieve the ben-
eﬁts of forecast sharing and collaborative planning.
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Table 1: Sample Records 
 
 Model Parameters Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 































































 PAST_LATE     0.190 (0.0003) 













































































 CANCEL*BOOK_BILL    -2.347 (0.0304) 
-2.347 
(0.0304) 
































 LL (In sample) - 2825.808 - 2817.200 -2814.833 -2812.167 -2807.576 
 LL(Out of sample) - 2682.620 - 2678.003 - 2674.764 -2668.180 -2659.400 
 


























  Actual Expected z score p-value 
1 2 0.218 3.811 0.000 
2 1 0.348 1.106 0.269 
3 3 2.142 0.586 0.558 
4 23 18.245 1.113 0.266 
5 48 53.912 -0.805 0.421 
6 177 169.569 0.571 0.568 
7 545 575.146 -1.257 0.209 
8 607 629.92 -0.913 0.361 











10 51 30.188 3.788 0.000 
Table 4:  May-Hosmer Test 
 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
LL -2825.808 -2817.200 -2814.833 -2812.167 -2807.576 
  17.216 4.734 5.332 9.182 
LR 
 
 (Model 2  
vs.  
Model 1) 
(Model 3  
vs.  
Model 2) 
(Model 4  
vs.  
Model 3) 
(Model 5  
vs.  
Model 4) 
d.f.  2 1 1 1 
p-value  0.000 0.030 0.021 0.002 











Figure 2: Changes in spending levels in the semiconductor industry
Figure 1: Forecast sharing and the prisoner dilemma
Buyer
Supplier
Buyer forecasts truthfully 
and supplier trusts the 
forecast.
Buyer forecasts truthfully, 
but supplier waits until a 
firm purchase order is 
submitted (buyer incurs 
cost of delay)
Buyer inflates forecast, 
supplier trusts the inflated 
forecast (supplier incurs 
cost of inventory and 
cancellation)
Buyer inflates forecast, 
supplier discounts 
forecasts and waits until 

































Figure 4: Forecasted (soft) orders versus actual orders
Y-Axis is currently blinded
Figure 3: Events leading to a firm order and tool delivery (non cancellation case)












Figure 5: Two step model
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